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This paper studies the relationships between managersa¢ liations with Freema-
sonry and companiesperformance. Using a unique data set of 410 companies quoted
on the London Stock Exchange between 1895 and 1902, I nd that Masonic managers
were associated with greater access to credit in small and young companies whose se-
curities where traded over the counter. These companies earned higher prots, but the
e¤ect is not statistically signicant. On the other hand, large publicly quoted corpora-
tions that were managed by Freemasons did not obtain greater access to credit; they
had lower prots and lower Tobins Q. These ndings help to understand how social
networks are related to companiesperformances. Although social networks help to
resolve agency problems between lenders and borrowers in rms that have di¢ culties
in obtaining debt nance, in larger publicly quoted companies they are associated with
worse agency conicts between managers and shareholders and with worse economic
performance.
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1 Introduction
The importance of social networks in determining economic outcomes is increasingly ac-
knowledged by economists. While studies have focused on various social networks such as
neighborhood e¤ects (Bertrand et al., 2000; Duo and Saez, 2003; Ioannides and Loury, 2004;
Bayer et al., 2005), friendships (Costa and Kahn, 2007), education (Kramarz and Thesmar,
2007; Cohen et al., 2007) and various sociological measures of centrality (Barnea and Guedj,
2007; Hochberg et al., 2007), no economic study has systematically examined the economic
relevance of the most celebrated and discussed social network: Freemasonry. The reason lies
in the availability of data: the oath to secrecy that every Freemason is expected to com-
ply with prevents the disclosure of information on individualsa¢ liation with the outside
world. Although studies on Freemasonry that employ todays data are nearly impossible,
they become feasible when analyzing past historical periods. Members of the fraternity have
passed away and Masonic lodges are sometimes willing to release membership information.
Using a unique data set of 410 companies quoted at the London Stock Exchange between
1895 and 1902, this paper studies the impact of managersa¢ liations with Freemasonry on
various measures of companiesperformances such as access to credit, accounting prots,
and market valuation.
Freemasonry is a form of social network particularly attractive for economic analyses
especially when studying companiesaccess to credit. Two typical frictions that characterize
the credit market are asymmetric information and contract enforceability. Social networks
are an e¤ective tool to resolve these issues by allowing individuals to gather information at
a low cost, resolve enforcement problems, and increase trust among market participants in
situations where trade is not anonymous and information does not ow freely. For instance,
the repeated interaction of a clubs members are an occasion to acquire information about
potential borrowers, while peer pressure and social sanctions within the club may help to en-
force contracts. In Freemasonry, the elements of knowledge, trust, and social sanctions have a
greater importance when compared to other networks studied in the literature. Freemasonry
is a secret club: it is well documented in the sociological literature that secrecy is associated
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with stronger group cohesion and deeper feelings of "belongingness" to the network (Simmel,
1906; Halzerigg, 1969; Fine and Holyeld, 1996). Freemasons are not known to the outside
world, but they display strong relationships among each other, gain a better knowledge of
each other, and develop a higher degree of trust in and reliance on each other. Freemasons
could be more willing to lend to other Freemasons because, for instance, loans granted within
the network have a lower probability of default. As a result, it is easier for a Freemason to
face market imperfections related to a lack of information or weak enforcement of property
rights which are especially important in the credit market. This paper exploits the charac-
teristics of this association and studies whether managersa¢ liations with Freemasonry are
associated with greater access to credit by the companies they managed.
In addition, the institutional characteristics of the London Stock Exchange in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century make the data employed in this study particularly
interesting. Although a rms admission to the London Stock Exchange was relatively easy
(Michie, 1999), the type of market that companys securities could have faced was di¤erent.
An important distinction was made between companies quoted and not quoted in the o¢ cial
list. If quoted in the o¢ cial list, companies securities were quoted on a daily basis and
they could fully enjoy the liquidity and name recognition benets of being traded in a
large market. Companies quoted in the o¢ cial list resembled modern corporations with a
clear distinction between ownership and control and they had a broad shareholder base.
Companies not quoted in the o¢ cial list retained the characteristics of private rms, they
were generally of smaller size and their shares were rmly controlled by the founding families.
The securities issued by these rms had a much narrower market. Existing economic studies
on social networks have focused on large publicly quoted corporations, in contrast my analysis
compares the di¤erent e¤ects of social networks on di¤erent classes of companies, paying
particular attention to how networks relate to the performance of small and "quasi-private"
companies versus larger public corporations. There are reasons to believe that network
e¤ects di¤er across rms. Studies on public corporations show that companies managed
by CEOs that are members of various social networks are characterized by bad corporate
governance practices: networks are associated with favoritism and nepotism worsening the
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agency conict between managers and shareholders (Barnea and Guedj, 2007; Kramarz and
Thesmar, 2007). On the other hand, in private companies with a narrow shareholders base
the agency problem between shareholders and managers is less severe: managers are usually
strictly supervised by the founding shareholders or are the founding shareholders. In these
companies, social networks should play less of a role in worsening corporate governance
practices. On the other hand, social networks can be e¤ective in a¤ording private companies
greater access to credit: these rms are usually less familiar to investors, they are smaller
and have less collateral; hence they have more di¢ culty to access debt nance.
The results show that companies run by Masonic managers had higher leverage ratios,
a proxy for access to credit. This e¤ect is particularly strong for companies not quoted in
the o¢ cial list. Companies outside the o¢ cial list that were managed by Freemasons were
about 5% more leveraged, if leverage is measured as total debt to total assets, and 6% more
leveraged if measured as long term debt (bonds and mortgages) to total assets. The result
still holds when I restrict the analysis to small companies, young companies, and companies
providing less collateral. These ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that a¢ liation
with Freemasonry improves access to credit for companies that have more di¢ culties in
obtaining debt nance.
Companies quoted in the o¢ cial list with Masonic managers did not display a greater
access to credit; they had lower prots and lower Tobins Q. These results are similar to those
obtained by recent nance analysis (Barnea and Guedj, 2007; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2007;
Kuhnen, 2007) and lend support to the notion that, in public corporations, social networks
are related to bad corporate governance and worse performance. Furthermore, I nd that
in public companies the various networking activities engaged in by managers who were
members of Freemasonry were detrimental to the companiesperformance. My analysis nds
that Masonic managers in companies quoted in the o¢ cial list were more likely to have friends
in other companies (i.e. they accumulated more outside directorships) and their companies
were more likely to have a politician on the administration board. These networking activities
resulted in both lower prots and lower market valuation: for instance, Freemasonsoutside
directorships were associated with a reduction of market valuation of about 7%, whereas
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political connections were linked to 4% lower accounting prots. Following the literature
(Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Booth and Deli, 1996), one way to interpret these results is that
Masonic managers were too busy in other activities and consequently spent less time at the
company and paid less attention to its business.
Freemasons were an important factor in companiesperformance. Their e¤ect was more
positive in quasi-private companies prone to experience more problems in accessing debt
nance; in publicly quoted companies the separation between ownership and control may
have given Masonic managers some scope to pursue wasteful activities.
This paper not only contributes to the small but growing literature that relates social net-
works either to rmscorporate governance or to mutual fund managersbehaviors (Barnea
and Guedj, 2007; Cohen et al., 2007; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2007; Kuhnen, 2007). It also
contributes to the literature on political connections (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006a,b; Ferguson
and Voth, 2007) to the extent that it examines the relationships between Masonic managers
and politicians on company boards, as well as the literature on social capital (Guiso et al.,
2004; Costa and Kahn, 2004).1 Costa and Kahn (2004) do not focus on companies, but
they examine the determinants of social capital of small groups, in the contexts of soldiers
desertions during the American civil war. Guiso et al. (2004) focus on the role of social
capital in householdsuse of nancial instruments in relatively large geographical entities
such as regions and provinces. This work focuses on social capital that characterizes smaller
voluntary associations. My analysis also complements the literature on the intellectual ori-
gins of modern economic growth, to the extent that it discusses the economic activities of a
club that played an important role in the dissemination of pro-business attitudes during the
eighteenth century (Mokyr, 2002, 2005; Elliot and Daniel, 2006).
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some historical background on
the British nancial world at the turn of the twentieth century and presents the main fea-
tures of Freemasonry, emphasizing the elements that are of interest for economists. Section
3 describes data and sources and presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables
1Social capital is dened as aspects of the social structure such as trust, networks, and conventions that
encourage collaboration and coordination between friends and strangers (Coleman, 1990).
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employed in the analysis. Section 4 uses the data to study the relationships between man-
agersa¢ liation with Freemasonry and various measure of companiesperformance such as
access to credit, accounting prots and Tobins Q. Section 5 provides empirical evidence
on Masonic managersnetworking activities and their impact on companiesperformance.
Section 6 discusses some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 The Late Nineteenth Century British Financial World
Around 1900 London was the most important nancial center in the world: the British stock
market was larger relative to GDP than that of the US, and was the second largest exchange
in the world (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Government bonds and domestic and international
railways constituted most of the oating nominal capital, with commercial and industrial
securities around 10% of the nominal capital traded. Limited liability, joint stock enterprises
were more common in Britain than in continental Europe. Britain in 1900 had about 30,000
joint stock companies, probably as many as all the rest of Europe and about half of the
size of joint stock companies as existed in the US at the beginning of the twentieth century
(Hannah, 2007b).
Companiesadmission to the London Stock Exchange was relatively easy. Consequently,
a wide range of companies, from quasi-private rms to more modern corporations could
have their securities quoted on the Exchange. An important distinction was made between
companies quoted and not quoted in the o¢ cial list. If quoted in the o¢ cial list, companies
securities were traded on a daily basis on the Exchanges oor and they could fully enjoy
the benets of being transacted in a large market. These companies resembled modern
corporations with a clear distinction between ownership and control and a broad shareholder
base. Companies not quoted in the o¢ cial list had a quasi-private form, they were generally
of smaller size and their shares were rmly controlled by the founding families. The securities
issued by these rms generated a much more limited amount of trade and had a narrower
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market.2
The reason for this distinction lay in the increasing popularity of the London Stock
Exchange in the late nineteenth century entrepreneurial world. Michie (Michie, 1999 p. 95)
reports that, between 1853 and 1913 the number of di¤erent securities quoted in London
rose enormously. As a result, the Exchange increasingly discriminated in the admission to
quotation on the ground of size and the expectation of the amount of trade that companies
(and their securities) could generate. As mentioned by Michie (1999 p.95):
"Many issues of securities were of small size and narrowly held, resulting in an
inactive market. Despite the rise in membership it was unrealistic to expect
dealers to be ready to buy and sell, on demand, every security quoted let alone
those that had not even been granted the privilege".
Incorporation was a popular phenomenon, but it was not until 1948 (or even later)
that Britain was equipped with legislation explicitly protecting minority shareholders and
creditors from nancial frauds. There were also no formal requirements for companies to
provide clear and standardized annual reports. Despite these limitations, the late nineteenth
century accounts certainly provided a great deal of information to investors. As mentioned
by Hannah (Hannah, 2007, p. 17): The great majority of companies in fact published more
and better information than was legally requiredand Sylla and Smith (1995 p. 190) report
that British investors had The best information possessed by any investors anywhere.
2.2 A Brief History of Freemasonry
Simmel (1906) denes secret societies as interactional units where the reciprocal relations
among its members are governed by the protective function of secrecy. Members of secret
2Rather than being admitted to the trading oor, securities outside the o¢ cial list were transacted through
the Challenge System. These securities were listed on the London Stock Exchange Telegraphic tape. A
member of the Exchange could broadcast his interest to others and so stimulate a sale or a purchase. There
is evidence that this system was used but there continued to be a large number of securities that had been
given a quote but generated little buying or selling (Michie, 1999 p.95).
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societies are concerned with the protection of ideas and activities to which they attach
positive value; they seek this protection by controlling the distribution of information and
creating condition of ignorance about their activities in the external environment. According
to Simmel, in fact, the secret is the ultimate sociological form for the regulation of the ow
and the distribution of information. Depending on the extent of the secrecy, secret societies
take two forms: those in which the secret incorporates information about all aspects of
the association, including its very existence; and those in which only some aspects remain
secret, such as membership, regulations, or goals. Freemasonry belongs to the second type
of society. Its existence was and is known, the basic principles are somewhat known and in
some instances even some of its members are known to the outside world.3
Freemasonry describes itself as a system of morality, veiled in allegory and illustrated
by symbols (Burt, 2003). The origins of Freemasonry lie in the religious fraternities that
developed in all Europe and especially in Britain after the Black Death in 1348. The Black
Death had caused a shortage of skilled masons, and the various local nobilty struggled to
keep wages down when commissioning the construction works of their palaces and churches.
The old Freemasonry (also known as operative masonry) was a sort of trade union that
engaged in negotiating better working conditions and higher wages. The secrecy of their
identity was maintained in order to protect the members from possible retaliation. It is
generally accepted organized masonry rst took hold in 1717 with the establishment of the
Grand Lodge of England. By that time, Freemasonry had evolved from a form of trade union
into in a more philosophical association concerned with protecting and promoting the ideals
of the Enlightenment. Secrecy was still a typical feature of the fraternity.
Organizationally, Freemasonry consisted of a series of mainly locally focused lodges, co-
ordinated in Britain by the Grand Lodge of England and Wales or the Grand Lodge of
Scotland. A man interested in becoming Freemason had to apply to the fraternity in order
to be considered. There was enough permeability so that non-Freemasons could have known
a few members and expressed their interest. Similarly, it is possible that members contacted
non-members and proposed to them an association with the fraternity. A candidate for
3Simmels view of secret societies is summarized in nine propositions by Halzerigg (1969).
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Freemasonry had to be a man of good reputation and integrity. He was required to be a free
man, and generally older than twenty-one years old. He needed to be well recommended and
regularly proposed to the lodge (Jones, p. 259). Formally, women are not accepted in the
Freemasonry, although there are a few known cases of women who became members.
2.3 Economic Relevance
There are at least two motives for economists to be interested in Freemasonry. As a form
of club, the social interaction among its a¢ liates contributes to resolving two of the typical
problems of nancial markets: asymmetric information and contract enforceability. Through
regular club meetings, members can learn of the reliability of their peers and, if entrepreneurs,
the quality of their business projects. As a result, club members are able to get loans at
favorable conditions directly from their fellows or more easily receive endorsements for loan
applications. Clubsmembers also tend to trust each other more, because the peer pressure
in their community is an e¤ective means to punishing crimes or fraud especially in situations
where courts are not e¤ective in enforcing property rights.
The elements of knowledge and trust are particularly relevant for secret societies and
Freemasonry. The sociological literature describes secret societies as characterized by a
greater degree of reciprocal trust among their a¢ liates, compared to other forms of asso-
ciations (Simmel, 1906; Halzerigg, 1969). The Masonic ethic is built on the ideal of trust
among members: Freemasons call each other brothers and are expected to comply with var-
ious obligations, among them a pledge not to cheat or defraud the lodge or other members.
Peer pressure certainly plays an important role as penalties for not respecting these obliga-
tions exist ranging from reprimand, suspension, or expulsion from the fraternity to, in some
ancient texts, even physical punishments.4 However, it is the high degree of condence in
each others observance of the secret that constitutes part of a secret societys uniqueness:
the secret and the solemn promise to not reveal it generate a strong team-building e¤ect and
consequently higher levels of trust among the members (Halzerigg, 1969). These elements
4Although it is believed that this physical punishment was just symbolical, representing how a mason
ought to feel after misbehaving towards other members(Mackey, 2005).
10
make Freemasonry a particularly interesting association when studying social network e¤ects
in capital markets.
A second reason for economists to be interested in Freemasonry is related to the role that
the fraternity historically assumed as a promoter of pro-business attitudes. Freemasons were
at the heart of the intellectual origins of the industrial revolution and contributed to the
di¤usion of the Enlightenment and natural philosophy in Britain and continental Europe.
Mokyr (2005) documents how the Enlightenment was an important driver of the industrial
revolution. The di¤usion of the Baconian ideals contributed to the dissemination of useful
knowledge, knowledge about natural phenomena and their regularities (Mokyr, 2002 p.3)
and of the idea that the mankind can achieve material progress through controlling nature
(Mokyr, 2005). As a result, this process facilitated the application of natural philosophy
to the solution of technical problems and stimulated the technological developments of the
eighteenth century. According to Mokyr (2005), clubs and scientic societies had a major
positive impact on the dissemination of useful knowledge. Following a similar argument,
Elliot and Daniel (2006) illustrate the importance of natural philosophy in Masonic rhetoric
and the e¤ort undertaken by members in spreading the Baconian ideals. Studying material
from Masonic histories, lodge records provide evidence that scientic lectures were indeed
given in some lodges and that Masonic lodges also promoted the di¤usion of peer-refereed
publications. In this perspective, this work sheds additional light on the contribution of
Freemasonry to British economic history by studying how Freemasons behaved as entrepre-
neurs.
3 Data
3.1 Sample and Sources
The sample consists of 410 British companies that corresponds to 573 company-years covering
the period 1895-1902. This sample is composed of two sub-samples that corresponds to
two di¤erent periods of time: 1895-1897 (224 companies) and 1900-1902 (349 companies).
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The sample covers a wide variety of manufacturing sectors: from chemicals to textiles, from
electricity manufacturing to leather and rubber, from paper and publishing to iron and steel.
I also consider three non-manufacturing industries: coal mining, railways, and electricity
supply. Table I lists the sectors in the sample and the number of rms in each sector.
The sample is not random: all the rms are public companies quoted on the London Stock
Exchange and represents a sizable portion of the capitalization of the Exchange. Hannah
(2007a) reports that the total capitalization of the London Stock Exchange on January 1st
1900 was about £ 887 million: the total capitalization of the companies in my 1900-1902
sample is £ 555 million, 63% of the gure reported by Hannah. All of the major railways
companies are in the sample. There were many smaller companies, but they were usually
owned by the bigger, and they were excluded. Data for electricity supply companies are taken
from Garckes Manual of Electrical Undertakings, a yearly publication where annual reports
of electricity undertakings were published. Among the electricity companies reported, I select
joint stock limited liability companies rather than municipal corporations: 20 companies
for 1895 and 24 companies for 1900. By far the majority of companies in the sample are
either English or Welsh. Only ve companies are Scottish: this is because information on
Freemasonry membership is not available for Scottish individuals.5
Information about companies is taken from original balance sheets and various annual
publications such as the Stock Exchange Year Book and the Stock Exchange O¢ cial Intel-
ligence. The balance sheets of public companies were retrieved from the Guildhall Library,
London. The information displayed on the balance sheets varies from company to company
and from year to year. From the accounts it is possible to obtain data such as companies
debts, revenues and physical assets. The balance sheets also report the names of the direc-
tors and their honoric titles (Lord, Sir, Baronet), the address of the rms headquarters,
and the rms works. Information about interlocking directorships were retrieved from an
annual publication called Directory of Directors. Data on stock prices are obtained from
the Investor Monthly Manual (IMM), a sister publication of the Economist. The IMM was
5The Grand Lodge of Edinburgh has data about the a¢ lation of Scotsmen to Freemasonry. Unfortunately,
I failed to reach an agreement with the Scottish Grand Lodge.
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published between 1871 and 1930 and recorded prices, dividends and capitalization for rail-
ways and various industrial companies. Companies quoted in the o¢ cial list appear in the
London Stock Exchange O¢ cial list. I consult this for the years 1895 and 1900.
Personal information about directors and managers is obtained from various censuses of
the population of England andWales between 1861 and 1901, available on Ancestry.com. The
censuses report data on year and place of birth of directors and their address. Thanks to the
Grand Lodge of England and Wales, it is possible to verify the a¢ liation with Freemasonry
for almost 600 directors and managers. Whenever a manager is indicated as Freemason, I
also obtain information on the date of his initiation as a member, his internal career and if
he eventually abandoned the fraternity.6
Out of 577 directors, 91 or 16% were reported as Freemasons. According to the in-
formation provided by the Grand Lodge of England and Wales about 1% of the British
male population in 1900 were Freemasons. The number of Freemasons is therefore over-
represented. Table I also reports the representations of Freemasons by industry. Masonic
managers were more common in traditional sectors such as Railways and Breweries where
34% and 33% of rms, respectively, were run by Freemasons. Bicycles and Motorcars held
also a relatively high representation of Freemasons, with 20% of companies in this sector
6Collecting these data proved particularly lengthy. The main challenge consisted of identifying the right
man in the Freemasonry membership lists. A typical example is a case where a director was called James
Smith and his company was located in London. Assuming that London was James Smiths most likely place
of residence hundreds of James Smith lived in London between the nineteenth and the twentieth century,
and possibly many of them were members of the Freemasonry. In order to identify the James Smith in my
dataset, it is necessary to check various census years of the population of England. The population census
provides several details on an individual, such as the civil and ecclesiastical parish where he/she lived, his/her
age, his/her place of birth, and his/her occupation. Occupation was the variable used to match an individual
in the dataset with an individual in the census. For example, if James Smith was managing director of a
Tobacco company, the census would have indicated his occupation as Director of Public Company in Tobacco
Trade or Manager of Tobacco Trades. Once the individual was found, it was possible to retrieve information
about his civil and ecclesiastical parish, along with the place of birth. This information allowed a precise
identication of the James Smith in the sample, also enabling the Grand Lodge of England and Wales to
search for a James Smith of interest in their records.
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managed by members of fraternity. Iron and Steel displayed the lowest percentage: 2%.
3.2 Main Variables and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, I dene the main variables used in the analysis and describe some descriptive
statistics. A full list of variable denitions is provided in Appendix A.
For the sub-period 1895-97 the variable Freemason is equal to 1 if the manager of the
company was a Freemason in 1895; for the sub-period 1900-1902 the variable Freemason
is equal to 1 if the manager was a Freemason in 1900. I dene as a manager either as
the director who was explicitly named as managing director in the annual report or any
individual who was explicitly indicated by the company as its manager: this constitutes 66%
of the cases; in cases where the managers name was not provided, I check if the surname of
any of the directors coincided with the name of the companies (for instance: Henry Firmin
was a director of Firmin & Sons) and assume that these directors were managers: (10%)
of the cases. In all the other cases I assumed that the chairman of the company was the
manager (24%). As shown in Table II about 19% of the companies in the sample have a
Freemason as manager.7
Two variables measure other forms of association or social networks: Interlock and Politi-
cians. The variable Interlock takes the value of 1 if the manager of a company was serving as
director in at least one other company. 37% of the companies had a manager with at least
one interlocking directorship.8 The variable Politician has the value of 1 if there was at least
one politician on the company board. Politicians can be either members of the House of the
Commons or members of the House of Lords. Table II shows that 33% of the companies in
the sample had at least one politician on the board.
Performance variables are leverage, taken as a proxy for access to credit, future protabil-
7Some companies had multiple managing directors. In these cases I assumed that a company was run
by a Masonic manager if at least one of managing directors was a Freemason. This explains why 16% of
managers were Freemasons, but 19% of companies were run by a Freemason.
8The number of observations in this case drops to 460 since the Directory of Directors did not report
information on all managers.
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ity, and Tobins Q. I measure leverage in three di¤erent ways. Leverage is rst calculated as
total long-term debt over total assets. Long-term debt is dened as the total value of bonds
and mortgages indicated in the balance sheets. The value of bonds and mortgages is usually
clearly stated both in the annual reports and in the Stock Exchange O¢ cial Intelligence.
The second measure of leverage, Long-term plus Loans, adds long-term debt together with
various loans indicated in the annual report and bank debt, whenever the company provided
the information. Many companies indicated various forms of debts in their balance sheet
with headings taking the name of "loans" or "various loans". These loans appear to be
long/medium-run forms of corporate debt whose origins and conditions are unknown. Given
the uncertain nature of their origin, they appear as the form of corporate debt that more than
any other was obtained through informal channels or thanks to personal contacts. A similar
argument applies to bank debt, as Capie and Collins (1999) report that on many occasions,
and despite the indications given by banksheadquarters, bank debt was granted on the basis
of personal relationships and trust between the local bank manager and the entrepreneur.
As a result, Long-term plus Loans sums up the formal and the possibly informal components
of long/medium-run corporate debt. The third measure of leverage is total debt over total
assets. The average leverage ratios range between 16% in case of Long Term Debt to Total
Liabilities and 25% when we consider Total Debt to Total Liabilities. These numbers are
lower than those presented by Rajan and Zingales (1995) for G7 economies and more in line
with the gures shown by Booth et al. for Emerging/Developing economies. The statistics
lend support to the notion that, as in Emerging economies nowadays, a hundred years ago
investor protection was relatively low and it was more troublesome for companies to obtain
credit than compared to more recent years (Franks et al., 2005).
The second measure of performance is protability measured as returns (prots) over
equity. Prots are computed after taxes and after interest.910 Current prots indicate
9Taxes were very low and not all the companies report interest payments. For a discussion on Corporate
Tax Rates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain see Braggion and Moore (2007).
10Depreciation indicated in the balance sheets did not represent the true value of the depreciation. In
general, depreciation was an instrument to accumulate secret reserves in good times (by setting it at a high
value) and to distribute dividends in bad times (by setting it at a low value). The balance sheets often
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protability at the beginning of each period: 1895 or 1900. Future protability stands for
returns over equity either in 1896 or 1901. Average protability ranges between 9 and 10%.
This result is comparable to the gures presented by Booth et al. in the case of emerging
economies and Faccio (2006a) on a sample of companies from various countries in both G7
and emerging economies. The third measure of performance is Tobins Q: I am able to
construct this measure only for a subsample of about 200 companies. Asset prices are in
fact available only for a limited number of rms, especially those quoted in the o¢ cial list.
The computation of the Tobins Q was done employing asset prices as in December 1901.11
Tobins Q is calculated as total value of the assets-book value of common equities plus market
value of the equities divided by total value of the assets.
The quality of the data also allow for the construction of several control variables. Follow-
ing the literature (La Porta et al., 2000), I construct a measure of investment opportunities
available to all companies based on the rmspast growth. Past growth is dened as the total
value of the assets in 1895 or 1900 minus the total value of the assets in 1894 or 1899 plus
dividends paid in 1895 or 1900 divided by the total value of the assets in 1894 or 1899. These
are the rst di¤erences in total values of the assets corrected by the fact that companies may
have paid dividends and already subtracted the dividend payment from the book value of
assets shown in the balance sheets. Tangibility is total xed assets divided by the book value
of the assets: the mean is 55% and the median is 57%, again a measure comparable with the
evidence presented by studies on more recent data.
display the amount of depreciation that allow me to construct an alternative measure of prots after taxes,
after interest and before depreciation (when the value was available). Results do not change and they are
available upon request.
11Robustness checks are performed using also companies average asset prices in 1901: results do not
change.
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4 Freemasons and CompaniesPerformance
4.1 Access to Credit
Here I study the impact of managersmembership of Freemasonry on companiesperfor-
mance. I employ three measures of performance: the leverage ratio, as proxy for access to
credit, future protability and Tobins Q.
The determinants of leverage have been extensively examined in nance studies (Harris
and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). I employ standard leverage
regressions and I regress the measures of leverage on companies characteristics such as
size, age, current protability, past growth (as a of proxy for investment opportunities) and
tangibility. I also control for a year-1900 dummy, a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a
company is quoted in the o¢ cial list and, in some specications, for industry dummies. The
focus of the analysis is an additional dummy variable, Freemason, that takes the value of 1
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where i is company-year in the sample and "i corresponds to the error term.
Despite using data over one hundred years old the availability and quality of information
in the annual reports make my analysis fully comparable with studies that use data from
more recent periods. Results on the leverage ratio Tobit and OLS regressions are presented
in Table III. The results show that the coe¢ cient on the dummy "Freemason" is positive
and statistically signicant in ve out of six specications.12 A company where the manager
12The analysis was also employed a panel random e¤ect techniques rather than pooled regressions. While
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was a Freemason was about 3% more leveraged than other companies, where leverage is
measured as Total Debt over Total Assets. The sample mean of Total Debt over Total
Assets is 25%: on average, a company run by a Freemason had a value of about 28%.
Results on the other control variables are strikingly similar to studies on more recent data.
Larger companies display higher leverage ratios and Tangibility has a positive e¤ect on
leverage. The coe¢ cient on present protability is negative. This result is consistent both
with the predictions of the pecking order theory, that protable companies prefer to obtain
nance through internal rather than external sources (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and with the
hypothesis that poorly performing companies prefer to avoid the disciplinary e¤ect of debt
(Jensen, 1986; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Also past growth has a negative coe¢ cient, but
it turns out to be statistically signicant only in two specications. Younger companies are
more leveraged, but the economic e¤ect appears to be quite small.
Table IV presents the results when the sample is split into companies quoted vs. com-
panies not quoted in the o¢ cial list. The results indicate that the Freemason variable has a
strong, positive, and statistically signicant impact on the leverage ratios of companies not
quoted in the o¢ cial list. (Table IV, columns 1-3). Freemasons yielded a higher leverage
ratio of 5.7% in case of long-term debt, 6.6% when we consider long-term debt and loans,
and 4.7% in the case of total debt. On the other hand, Masonic managers at companies
in the o¢ cial list were not associated with higher leverage ratios: the coe¢ cient on the
variable Freemason has either a positive or negative sign, it is small and never statistically
signicant. The di¤erence between the coe¢ cients associated with the dummy Freemason in
the two samples is also statistically signicant at either the 5% or the 10% level depending
on the specication. Companies not quoted in the o¢ cial list were semi-private companies,
making the strong assumption that the unobserved, time-constant rm e¤ects are independent of all the other
explanatory variables, this technique yields more e¢ cient estimates (Petersen, 2007). With panel random
e¤ects, the coe¢ cients on "Freemason" are, in fact, estimated more precisely, with a degree of statistical
signicance equal to 1% in most of the specications. I do not present these results, but they are available
upon request. Since the analysis considers only two time periods, the panel is quite unbalanced and many
varialbles are quite persistent through time, a panel xed e¤ect regression is not a suitable technique for this
analysis.
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where equity was rmly controlled by the founder shareholders. They were smaller, they
could o¤er less collateral and they were more subject to problems of asymmetric information
especially in respect to debt-holders. In this environment social networks were especially
important to obtain credit. To further explore this issue, I split the sample along other di-
mensions alternative to companieslisting status. In particular, I focus on company size, age,
and tangibility. Results are displayed in Table V. Panel (a) presents results for companies
in the lowest and in the highest 25% quartile of company size. Freemason is positive and
statistically signicant for the very small companies in the rst 25% size quartile. On the
other hand, Freemasons does not have a statistically signicant impact on the top 25% size
quartile as well as the other quartiles.13 In unpresented results, when the sample is split into
companies below and above the median company size, the variable Freemason is not sta-
tistically signicant in both subsamples, conrming that Masonic managers were associated
with greater access to credit especially for very small companies. In the case where the sam-
ple is divided between young companies (companies below the median age of eleven years)
and old companies (companies above the median age), Freemason has a positive and sta-
tistically signicant coe¢ cient on young companies (Table V, panel (b)): young companies
managed by Freemasons were between 5% and 7% more leveraged depending on the deni-
tion of leverage. Similarly, I nd that Freemasons has a positive and statistically signicant
e¤ect on companies that had less collateral (Table V, panel (c)). Finance theory suggests
collateral can be useful to sort out borrowers with good investment projects from borrowers
with bad investment projects (Besanko and Thakor, 1987a,b; Boot et al., 1991) and it may
o¤er a safe compensation to lenders if courts are not e¢ cient in enforcing creditor protection
legislation (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004; Cooley et al.,
2004). If relationships among Freemasons alleviate problems of asymmetric information and
contract enforceability and they are characterized by a reciprocal high level of trust, a¢ lia-
tion with Freemasonry should be especially important in allowing a greater access to credit
to companies that have less collateral. Trust, better knowledge of the borrower, and peer
13I present only the results for the bottom and top quartiles. For the second and third quartiles the
variable Freemason does not have a statistically signicant coe¢ cient.
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pressure should be enough to guarantee that loans will be repaid. The analysis shows that
membership of Freemasonry appears to be an important instrument in solving asymmetric
information and contract enforceability issues for these companies.
4.2 Future Protability and Tobins Q
As a second measure of performance I use protability measured as returns over equities. I
regress this measure on the variable Freemasons and various controls:
Future Protability i = + Freemasoni + 
0
Controlsi + "i (4)
The controls are a companys size and age, and following Yermack (1996) the size of the
administration board. The size of the board is both a proxy for the monitoring abilities
of the boards over the manager (in principle, bigger boards should monitor better), but
also a proxy for the degree of bureaucracy and a boards lenghty decision making (bigger
boards are more bureaucratic). The sign on this variable can either be positive or negative:
better monitoring means better corporate governance and so better performance; on the
other hand, more lengthy decision making and more bureaucracy should have a negative
e¤ect on a companys protability. The results are presented on Table VI. Over the whole
sample, the variable Freemason has a negative sign statistically signicant at the 10% level
in the specication that does not control for industry dummies. When I split the sample
between quoted and unquoted companies: Freemason has a positive but not statistically
signicant e¤ect in companies not quoted in the o¢ cial list, whereas it has a negative and
statistically signicant e¤ect on companies quoted in the list. In the latter case, Masonic
mangers were associated with returns over equities that were 2.9% lower than an average
company. Since the average protability for companies in the o¢ cial list was 8%, companies
run by Freemasons experienced a reduction in prots of about 35%. Larger companies tended
to be less protable, the size of the board of directors has a positive sign, but not statistically
signicant.
The third performance variable is Tobins Q. In this case the regression is:
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Tobin0s Qi = + Freemasoni + 
0
Controlsi + "i (5)
Controls again are size, age of the company, and the size of the administration board.
Moreover, I also control for current protability. As the previous regressions, I also have
specications where I control for industry dummies. The results are displayed in Table VII.
I present the results for the whole sample of companies for which asset prices are available
and for the sub-sample of rms quoted in the o¢ cial list.14 In all the specications the
dummy Freemason has a negative and 5% or 10% statistically signicant coe¢ cient. The
economic magnitude is also quite important: the Tobins Q of an average company is about
10% lower if managed by a Freemason. The size of the board of directors has a positive
coe¢ cient statistically signicant at 1% or 5% level. This result is consistent both with the
notion that larger boards enhanced better monitoring, increasing companiesprotability
and with the idea that more protable companies increased the number of directors serving
in the their boards.
The overall picture shows that despite having a better access to capital markets, com-
panies run by Freemasons were doing no better than, in some cases, worse than their peers.
A possible interpretation is that the extra resources were badly managed and employed in
not very protable investment projects. Especially for companies quoted in the o¢ cial list,
where there was a clearer separation of ownership and control, poor corporate governance and
poor minority shareholders protection may have given some room for managers to indulge
in wasteful activities.
4.3 Endogeneity
Managersmemberships of Freemasonry may be correlated with some unobserved factors
related to abilities, ambitions and trustworthiness of the entrepreneurs. All these elements,
unobservable to the econometrician, may have had an impact on companiesperformance.
14Most of the rms with available information on asset prices were quoted in the o¢ cial list, hence the
sample sizes are similar.
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In the analysis presented in the previous section, these concerns were partially taken into
account. For instance, the leverage regressions control for several companiescharacteristics,
such as current protability and growth opportunities, that should capture unobserved man-
agerial abilities.15 To further address this concern, I employ an endogenous treatment e¤ects
model as discussed in Maddala (Maddala, 1983, pp. 117-122). Managersa¢ liation with
Freemasonry is treated as endogenous and modeled with a probit regression where I relate
the managersprobability of being Freemasons to companies and managerscharacteristics.
The probit regression allows the estimation of the each managersprobability of being a
Freemason: these probabilities are then inserted in the performance regressions (1)-(5) re-
placing the dummy variable "Freemason". In these models it is recommended to employ one
or more exclusion restrictions in the probit analysis: one or more variables that are believed
to a¤ect a managers probability of being a Freemasons that have no impact on a companys
performance. I consider two exclusion restrictions. The rst one is a dummy variable that
assumes the value of 1 if the manager worked in the same place where he was born. This
variable captures the notion that an individual who stayed and worked in the same county
where he was born was more likely to have deep and long-standing relationships with other
individuals in his environment. As a result, the manager was more likely to have access
to local social networks. On the other hand, the place of work, in relation to the place of
birth, should not have a strong direct e¤ect on access to credit or protability.16 The other
15Introducing managers age, a proxy of managers experience, in the performance regressions leaves results
unchanged. Freemason is still positive and statistically signicant in the leverage regressions and negative
and statistically signicant in the protability analysis. Moreover, the variable managers age never turns
out to be statistically signicant.
16In the context of rural-urban migration, Long (2005) uses a similar identication assumption. Living in a
town di¤erent from the place of birth is considered a determinant of an individuals decision to migrate, but
not a determinant of how well an individual performed in term of job attainment. Moreover, Long (2005)
shows that there was neither positive nor negative selection for individuals coming from entrepreneurial
families (i.e sons of entrepreneurs) who actually migrated into urban areas and individuals coming from
entrepreneurial families who decided not to migrate. This result lends support to the idea that, at least in
the case of upper classes, movers were not necessarily more gifted individuals than stayers and vice-versa.
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exclusion restriction is a second dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if a manager
was born in London and zero otherwise. It is unlikely that being born in London gave an ad-
vantage to individuals in term of wealth or education: all managers related factors that may
have directly a¤ected companiesperformance. Around 1851 (the average year of birth of the
managers in the sample), London was already the highest income and wealthiest region in
Britain, but many other regions well represented in my sample, such as Lancashire and West
Anglia, displayed high income and wealth per capita as well (Rubinsten, 1981; Rubinstein,
1987; Crafts, 2005). Rubinstein (1987 p. 195-196) also discusses how many successful entre-
preneurs working in late nineteenth century Britain did not attend prestigious schools such
as Eton and Harrow and that they rarely had a college degree: they were more models of self-
made men who got their education by directly working in the factory. It seems more likely
that London, as a place of birth, had a direct e¤ect on individualsaccess to social networks,
although the sign of this e¤ect is uncertain. On the one hand, London was the center of
networking activities in Britain: entrepreneurs born in London, for instance, may have been
from families traditionally linked to Freemasonry, making them more likely members. On
the other hand, competition with other networks could have made it less likely for individu-
als to be Freemasons: London o¤ered innite networking possibilities outside Freemasonry.
Moreover, Money (1993) shows that the number of London lodges steadily declined during
the second half of the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth century, again making
entrepreneurs born in London less likely to be associated with Freemasonry.17
The results of the analysis are in Table VIII (panels (a), (b), and (c)). Panel (a) relates
the choice of being Freemason to all the variables considered in the second stage plus the
two exclusion restrictions.18 Managers working in the same county where they were born
were about 12% more likely to be Freemasons which is statistically signicant at the 1%
17A possible critique of this approach is that the two exclusion restrictions could be highly correlated: in
principle it is possible that people born in London were less likely to leave the city. However, the correlation
between the two variables, "Work in County of Birth" and "Born in London" is 31%: positive, but not
tremendously high.
18I present here only the results on the leverage equation since the results on future protability and
Tobins Q are very similar.
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level (5% when I control for industry dummies). A manager born in London was about 7%
less likely to be a Freemason, statistically signicant at the 10% level in the specication
without industry dummies; when I control for industry dummies the sign and the size of the
variable is basically unchanged but I lose statistical signicance.
The results of the leverage and protability equations are in Table VIII panel (b) and
(c). In 5 out of 6 specications the Freemasons variable has a positive sign, statistically
signicant at the 1% level. The economic signicance is similar to what was presented in
the previous leverage and protability analyses: the average probability of managers being
Freemasons is 20%. A standard deviation increase of this gure would make companies
about 4% more leveraged. Companies run by Freemasons were less protable than other
companies, but this e¤ect is not statistically signicant. On the other hand, Freemasons still
has a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on Tobins Q. A standard deviation increase
of managersprobability of being Freemasons decreases companiesTobins Q of about 7%.
5 Freemasons and other Social and Economic Networks
This section examines the relationships between Freemasonry and other social networks re-
cently studied by the economics and nance literature. In particular, I study the relationships
between Freemasonry and interlocking/outside directorships held by managers and between
Freemasonry and politicians on companiesboards. The analysis addresses two issues. First,
did Freemasonry interact with other social networks? In other words, were Freemasons an
isolated club or were they willing to participate in other forms of social interaction? Second:
did Freemasonsnetworking activities have an impact on companiesperformance? An an-
swer to the latter question may provide a channel useful to explain the association between
Masonic managers and the poor economic performance of companies quoted in the o¢ cial
list. In these situations, Masonic managers could have been too busy participating in other
networks and dedicated less time to the business of their company.
The nance literature has analyzed what factors lead CEOs or directors to take on out-
side directorships. On one hand, the accumulation of outside directorships may be correlated
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with non-value maximizing behavior: CEOs, for instance, may seek prestige and extra com-
pensation by serving on multiple boards. Naturally, if CEOs are too busy, they will dedicate
less time to their own companies, with negative e¤ects on its performance. On the other
hand, the market for directorships may work e¢ ciently and induce successful CEOs to serve
on multiple boards while leaving less successful o¢ cers serving only one company (Kaplan
and Reishus, 1990; Booth and Deli, 1996). From this perspective, serving on other boards
could serve as a measure of CEO quality. In addition serving on other boards may enhance
performance due to information sharing and exploitation of economies of scale and scope.
Another form of social network that has generated interest among economists is political
connections. Political connections, i.e. the relationship between rms and members of the
government or parliament, have been identied as a possible source of value for companies,
especially in high corruption countries. Faccio (2006b), uses a cross-section of companies
located in various countries to show that politically connected rms experience 1.4% excess
returns on the announcement that a politician was appointed to their board or that com-
panieso¢ cers entered politics; a gure that increases to 4.3% in countries that rank highly
on various measures of corruption. Although political connections may bring value, Faccio
(2006a) also shows that politically connected rms perform worse than their peers in terms
of accounting prots and display lower market to book ratios. Politically connected rms
may su¤er more than other companies from governance problems.
Table IX displays the results of the analysis on the probability that a Freemason director
accumulated interlocking directorships. Columns (1) and (2) reports the marginal e¤ects
of the probit analysis results for managers using all the companies available in the sample.
The regressions control for industry dummies, a time dummy and a dummy that indicates
whether a company is quoted in the o¢ cial list. I present two specications: the rst does
not control for managerspersonal characteristic such as age and place of birth; the second
does.
A Freemason manager was 9% more likely to have an interlocking directorship although
this gure is not statistically signicant. Managers of bigger companies were more likely to
have outside directorships, whereas current protability, while having a negative sign, is not
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statistically signicant. Splitting the sample in companies quoted (columns 3 and 4) versus
companies not-quoted in the o¢ cial list (columns 5 and 6) highlights that managers of quoted
companies were 27% more likely to serve another company: a value statistically signicant
at the 1% level in the specication that does not correct for managers personal charac-
teristics and 5% statistically signicant in the specication that does correct for personal
characteristics. On the other hand, for companies not quoted in the o¢ cial list there was no
relationship between a¢ liation with Freemasonry and outside directorships. The coe¢ cients
on the dummy Freemason are either positive or negative, depending on the specication,
and they are never statistically signicant.
Table X reports the likelihood that a company run by a Freemason will have a politician
on the board. Again, I present the marginal e¤ects of a probit analysis. In the whole sample,
companies run by Freemasons were between 5.7% and 8.2% more likely to have a politician
on the board, these gures are marginally statistically signicant. When I split the sample
into quoted versus unquoted companies, quoted companies, with Freemason managers, were
27% more likely to have a politician on the board, a gure statistically signicant at the 1%
level. On the other hand, companies not quoted in the o¢ cial list show either no correlation
between Freemasons and political connections or a negative correlation of about 12% (when
managers characteristics are taken into account) which is statistically signicant at the 10%
level. Company size is positively associated with the likelihood of having a politician on the
board (1% statistically signicant); politicians were more likely to serve on more protable
companies, but the correlation is not statistically signicant.
I now turn to the second questions: did Freemasons networking activities enhance com-
paniesperformances? I run a treatment e¤ect model where, as a rst stage, I will relate
managers probabilities of having an outside directorship or political connection to their
eventual membership to Freemasonry. I impose Freemasonry a¢ liation as exclusion restric-
tion in the model, in order to measure the part of interlocking directorships and politicians
on board directly related to a managers Freemasonry membership. In a second stage, I will
evaluate the impact of the pure-Freemasonsnetworking activities on performance. I will
run this analysis only on companies quoted in the o¢ cial list, as in this situation, Masonic
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managers displayed a strong and positive relationship with outside directorships and political
connections.
Results of the second stage are presented in Table XI. Interlocking directorships have a
positive impact on total debt to total liabilities and a negative impact on protability. The
impact on leverage positive and statistically signicant. An increase of one standard devi-
ation of managers probability of having at least an outside directorships increases leverage
of about 6% (average leverage ratio is about 25%). Outside directorships related to Freema-
sonry have a negative e¤ect on protability: outside directorships reduced both returns over
equities and Tobins Q by 20% when compared to an average companies. Political connec-
tions related to Masonic managers have a negative and not statistically signicant e¤ect on
leverage, but they have a negative impact on protability: companies have returns over as-
sets 20% lower than average companies when the probability of having an politician on board
increases of a standard deviation. Political connections related to Freemasonry also reduce
Tobins Q: a standard deviation increase on the probability of having a politician on board
reduced Tobins Q of about 9%. The results of the analysis show that Freemasonsnetwork-
ing activities had a detrimental e¤ect on companiesperformances, lending support to the
idea that interlocking directorships and politicians on the board were related to non-value
maximizing activities. The entrepreneurial and nancial environment of the period may
help to interpret these results. The analysis was run for companies quoted in the o¢ cial list,
companies that resemble modern corporations, with a clear distinction between ownership
and control. For these companies agency problems between shareholders and managers were
particularly severe. The low degree of investor protection (as reported by Franks, Mayer and
Rossi, 2005) may have given managers, and especially manager members of Freemasonry,
enough freedom to pursue non-value-maximizing activities at the expense of prots. Why
were Freemasons in companies outside the o¢ cial list not associated with other networks? It
could be that opportunities for networking were fewer for these companies, since they were
not as visible as their o¢ cial list counterparts. It is also possible that the founder/owner
families of the companies had enough control and could prevent managers from wasting times
and resources in networking activities.
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6 Robustness
6.1 Quotation in the O¢ cial List and Unobserved Heterogeneity
The admission of a company to the o¢ cial list was based on the size of the company and on
the expectation that its securities would generate trade.
It may be possible that the inclusion (or not) in the o¢ cial list may be correlated with
some unobserved factors that could also a¤ect a Freemasons impact on the various dependent
variables considered in this study. For instance, companies in the o¢ cial list might have
been particularly prestigious. Both Freemasons and politicians sought to work in prestigious
companies, consequently the correlation between Freemasons and politicians in the o¢ cial
list could be explained simply by a companys prestige.
To control for this possibility, I run a Heckman two step procedure, in the rst stage I
correlate the probability of being quoted in the o¢ cial list to various characteristics, in the
second I evaluate the impact of Freemasonry on the various dependent variables. In this
case an exclusion restriction is needed. I assume that location, and in particular whether the
company was located in the London area or not, a¤ected the probability of being quoted in
the o¢ cial list, whereas it did not a¤ect, for instance, the probability of having a politician
on the board or the leverage ratios. The expectation of trade at the London Stock Exchange
depended on the how well securities were known by London investors: it is reasonable to
think that investors (London banks and local funds) had a broader knowledge of companies
located in the London area. On the other hand, despite parliament being located in London,
it is unlikely that London companies had an advantage in obtaining a Lord or politicians
as member of their board. First of all, quite often companies had local politicians on their
boards, for instance the Duke of Devonshire served as director in most of the companies
located in his county (Thompson, 1963, p. 307). Second, we have evidence that companies
that were foreign to the London environment appointed politicians on their boards in order to
be better networked with the elites in the capital. Similarly, the London location is unlikely
to have a strong correlation with leverage. The banking system was widespread throughout
the country, there is no reason to think that trade credit was more important in London than
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anywhere else. Provincial companies may have had more di¢ culties in maintaining contact
with London investors, but they could have placed their equities and bonds issues on the
provincial stock exchanges.
The results of the Heckman 2-step procedure are in Table XII panel (a) and (b). In panel
(a) I show the rst stage of the analysis: the marginal e¤ects of a probit regression where
the dependent variable is a dummy that assumes the value of 1 if a company is quoted in
the o¢ cial list and zero otherwise. Companies located in London were 20% more likely to
be quoted in the o¢ cial list, a value statistically signicant at the 1% level. Interestingly,
companies run by Freemasons were not necessarily more or less likely to be in the o¢ cial
list: the coe¢ cient is positive but not statistically signicant.
The results of the second stage on the dependent variables are presented in panel (b).
The results are basically unchanged from those in section 4.1. Freemason has a positive
e¤ect on leverage for companies quoted in the o¢ cial list. Masonic managers were associated
with lower future protability and with lower Tobins Q.
6.2 Average Future Protability and Controlling for Outliers
Future protability is dened as return over equity in the years 1901-02. Return over eq-
uity can be very volatile, especially when working with historical data, in periods where
accounting practices were not well dened and not standardized by legislation. To address
this problem, I re-run the protability regressions using as a dependent variable the average
returns over equity for two years, 1901-02 and 1902-03. The main results are in Table XIII.
Masonic managers are associated with lower prots in companies quoted in the o¢ cial list.
Companies run by Freemasons not quoted in the o¢ cial list had higher prots, but this
result is not statistically signicant.
As a second check, I also control for any outliers. I run robust regressions that correct
for outlier biases using Cooks D-Test. These regressions eliminate observations for Cooks
D statistic greater than one and iteratively select weights for the remaining observations to
reduce the absolute value of the residuals. The outcomes of this analysis are in Table XIV.
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I use full sample data for the various measures of leverage ratio and future protability: all
the results are unchanged. For the other specications results do not change, and they are
available upon request.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the relationships between managersa¢ liation with Freemasonry and
companieseconomic performances in Britain between 1895 and 1902. Using a dataset on
managers and companies quoted at the London Stock Exchange, I nd that companies run
by managers that were members of Freemasonry had greater access to credit, measured with
di¤erent leverage ratios. Exploiting the institutional features of the London Stock Exchange,
I distinguish between rms that had the form of modern publicly quoted companies with
a clear distinction between ownership and control, versus small quasi-private companies
whose control was in the hands of the founding shareholders. Masonic managers had a
strong e¤ect in increasing access to credit for quasi-private companies. These companies
exhibited higher prots, but the e¤ect is statistically and economically weak. On the other
hand, publicly quoted companies run by Freemasons did not have higher leverage ratios
and they experienced lower prots and lower Tobins Q. Masonic managers who worked
in public companies participated in other networks: they were more likely to accumulate
outside directorships and their companies were more likely to have politicians on the board.
These networking activities translated into lower prots: outside directorships related to
Freemasonry reduced companiesprots by about 5%, whereas political connections were
associated with 10% lower prots. The results are robust to various specications and to a
two-step procedure that corrects for endogeneity bias.
The ndings of this paper give additional support to the hypothesis that social networks,
rather than having positive e¤ects on companies, are more likely to be related to managers
non-value-maximizing activities. This e¤ect is particularly strong in public companies, where
there is a clear distinction between ownership and control and where, in principle, agency
problems between management and shareholders are more severe.
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Appendix A: Variable Denitions
Age: Year since date of incorporation of the company.
Size: Total Assets of the company as displayed in the balance sheet.
Growth: (Total Assets in 1901 (1896) minus Total Assets in 1900 (1895) plus Dividend
payments in 1900 (1895))/Total Assets in 1900 (1895).
Current Protability: Returns over equities in 1900 (1895)
Future Protability: Returns over Equities in 1901 (1896)
Returns on Equities (ROE): Earnings divided by total equity.
Earnings: Earnings after interest, depreciation, and taxes.
Long Term Debt to Total Assets: Total of Mortgages and Bonds divided by Total
Assets
Long Term Debt and Loans to Total Assets: Long Term Debt plus Loans and
Bank Debt divided by Total Assets
Total Debt to Total Assets: Long Term, Loans, Bank Debt and Short Term Debt
divided by Total Assets
Tangibility: Total Fixed Assets divided by Total Assets
Total Fixed Assets: Sum of Properties, Plants, and Equipments as reported in the
Balance Sheets
Freemason: Dummy variable that assumes the value of one if the manager of a company
in the sample was Freemason and zero otherwise.
Size of the Board: number of board members as indicated in the annual report
Born in London: Dummy variable that assumes the value of one if the manager of a
company in the sample was born in London
Work in the sample county where born: Dummy variable that assumes the value
of one if the manager of a company works in the same county where he was born
Managers Age: Age of the Manager in 1900 (1895)
36
Politician: a member of the House of Commons or a Member of the House of Lords
Interlocking Directorship: Dummy variable that assumes the value of one if the
manager of a company in the sample has at least an outside directorship in another company
Company Located in London Area: Dummy variable that assumes the value of one
if the headquarters of a company in the sample is located in Middlesex, or Surrey, or Kent
Tobins Q: {Book Value of Assets - Book Value of Common Equity + Market Value of
Common Equity} divided by Book Value of Assets.
37
Table I
Industries and Freemasons Representation
% Companies run by Freemasons Obs
Breweries 33 39
Bicycle and Motorcars 20 35
Electricity Supply 14 44
Engineering 17 106
Mines and Quarries 15 62
Iron and Steel 2 46







Panel A: Full Sample
Mean Median Std. Deviation # Obs
Size 2.77 0.27 12.52 573
Age 16 11 14.19 573
Tangibility 0.55 0.57 0.27 573
Past Growth 0.08 0.05 0.153 547
Freemason 0.19 0 0.40 574
Managing Director Interlocking 0.37 0 0.48 459
Politicians 0.33 0 0.47 573
Long Term Debt to Total Assets 0.16 0.15 0.15 554
Long Term 1 Debt to Total Assets 0.18 0.18 0.15 554
Total Debt to Total Assets 0.25 0.26 0.15 554
Current Protability 0.09 0.06 0.20 573
Future Protability 0.07 0.06 0.08 528
Tobins Q 1.09 1.02 0.376 248
39
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics - Companies Quoted in the O¢ cial List
Mean Median Std. Deviation # Obs
Size 6.21 0.71 18.82 235
Age 21 16 15.63 235
Tangibility 0.59 0.65 0.27 235
Growth 0.08 0.05 0.15 226
Freemason 0.21 0 0.41 235
Managing Director Interlocking 0.39 0 0.49 178
Politicians 0.50 1 0.50 234
Long Term Debt to Total Assets 0.17 0.19 0.15 230
Long Term 1 Debt to Total Assets 0.19 0.19 0.15 230
Total Debt to Total Assets 0.25 0.26 0.15 230
Current Protability 0.10 0.06 0.29 235
Future Protability 0.08 0.06 0.08 218
Tobins Q 1.11 1.02 0.39 210
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics - Companies not Quoted in the O¢ cial List
Mean Median Std. Deviation # Obs
Size 0.42 0.17 2.45 338
Age 12 10 12.01 338
Tangibility 0.52 0.52 0.28 338
Growth 0.08 0.05 0.17 321
Freemason 0.17 0 0.38 338
Managing Director Interlocking 0.35 0 0.48 281
Politician 0.21 0 0.41 337
Long Term Debt to Total Assets 0.15 0.13 0.15 324
Long Term 1 Debt to Total Assets 0.17 0.17 0.15 324
Total Debt to Total Assets 0.25 0.25 0.15 324
Current Protability 0.08 0.06 0.11 338
Future Protability 0.07 0.06 0.08 310










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Treatment E¤ects Model: Probit Analysis Results
This table shows the marginal e¤ects of probit estimates on the probability that a manager was a member of Freemasonry.
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the manager was a Freemason in 1895 or 1900 and zero otherwise.All
regressions control for a year 1900 dummy, a dummy that assumes the value of 1 if the company was quoted in the o¢ cial list
and zero otherwise. Column (2) controls for industry dummies. Standard errors clustered by rms are reported in

































Pseudo R-Squared 0.07 0.11
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Freemasons and Protability: Treatment E¤ects
This table shows treatment e¤ects-maximum likelihood estimates of the e¤ect of managersmemberships of Freemasonry on
companiesfuture protability and Tobins Q. All regressions control for a year 1900 dummy and a dummy that assumes the
value of 1 if the company was quoted in the o¢ cial list and zero otherwise. Regressions in columns (2) and (4) control for
industry dummies. Standard errors clustered by rms are reported in parentheses. *** signicant at less than 1%; **
signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Future Protability Future Protability Tobins Q Tobins Q






































Wald Chi2 9.15 73.23 31.04 58.08








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FreemasonsNetworking Activities and CompaniesPerformances
This table shows treatment e¤ects-maximum likelihood estimates of the e¤ect of managersinterlocking directorship and
companiespolitical connections on leverage ratios, future protability, and Tobins Q. All regressions control for a year 1900
dummy and a dummy that assumes the value of 1 if the company was quoted in the o¢ cial list and zero otherwise and for
industry dummies. Standard errors clustered by rms are reported in parentheses. *** signicant at less than 1%; **
signicant at 5%; * signicant at 10%.
Interlocking Directorships Political Connections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Debt Future Protability Tobins Q Total Debt Future Protability Tobins Q





























































Wald Chi2 66.28 28.04 31.68 120.00 54.14 24.70
# Obs 170 165 155 225 220 210
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